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Abstract
We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to
two independent M=M=1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices.
The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of
prices and logarithmic returns are observed. In the ergodic regime, prices are unstable and one can observe a
heteroskedastic behavior in the logarithmic returns. On the contrary, non-ergodicity triggers stability of prices, even if two
different regimes can be seen.
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Introduction
The continuous double auction is the trading system used by most
regulated equity markets. The auction is called double as demand
and offer are collected in a book where orders to buy and to sell
are registered, and continuous because orders can be placed at any
instant in a given daily time window. The detailed rules for trading
may be different from one stock exchange to the other, but,
essentially, things work as follows. Traders can either place buy
orders (bids) or sell orders (asks) which are then registered in a book
for a particular stock traded in the exchange. The limit order is the
typical one. A bid limit order is specified by two numbers: the
quantity q
(T )
b that trader T wants to buy and the upper limit price
p
(T)
b she is willing to pay for a single share. An ask limit order is an
order to sell q(T)a units of the share at a price not smaller than a







a ) are written in the book and ordered from the best bid to
the worst bid and from the best ask to the worst ask, respectively.
The best bid is the price pb~maxT[Ib (p
(T)
b ), where Ib is the set of
traders placing bids, whereas the best ask is the price
pa~minT[Ia (p
(T)
a ), where Ia is the set of traders placing asks. At
every time t, one has that pa(t)wpb(t). Occasionally, a market order
may take place, when a trader accepts a best bid or best ask price
from the book, and the i-th trade occurs at the epoch ti. Stock
exchanges specify rules for the priorities of limit orders placed at
the same price and for execution of market orders with quantities
that are not totally available at the present best price. The
sequence of prices p(ti) at which trades take place at epochs ti is an
important process for understanding market dynamics. As detailed
below, one can describe this sequence in terms of a suitable
continuous-time random walk.
Model
In our model, following [1], prices assume N integer values
from 1 to N . A price can be regarded as a class where orders are
placed. This way of representing prices is a faithful representation
of what happens in real markets due to price discretization. The
only unrealistic feature is the presence of an upper limit to prices
which we keep to ensure partial analytical tractability. Note that
orders can be considered as objects to be classified by prices at
which they are placed (see [2] for a general discussion on the
problem of allocating objects to classes). We only consider two
kinds of orders, namely, limit orders and market orders.
As discussed above, limit orders can be of two types: limit bid
orders, i.e. orders to buy one share and limit ask orders, i.e. orders
to sell one share. Market orders are also of two types as either the
best limit bid order or the best limit ask order are accepted when a
transaction occurs. When a market order arrives, only one limit
order will be removed either from the best bid category or the best
ask category, provided that these categories contain at least one
order. In other words, we assume that all the orders are
characterized by quantities equal to one share. We shall further
assume that limit ask orders arrive following a Poisson process with
rate la and that limit bid orders arrive at a rate lb. These orders
are written in the book and they wait until a market order arrives.
Remember that the best limit bid orders, namely the limit bid
orders offered at the highest price are always strictly smaller than
the best limit ask orders, that is the limit ask orders offered at the
lowest price. Market orders to buy, accepting one of the best ask
orders, arrive in the market separated by exponentially distributed
waiting times with parameter mb, whereas market orders to sell
arrive with an exponential distribution of waiting times with
parameter ma. If the book is empty, or if the appropriate side of the
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book is empty, market orders are not executed. It is necessary to
remark that order inter-arrival times are not exponentially
distributed in real markets [3] due to the non-stationary behavior
of humans [4]. However, to ensure analytical tractability, here we
assume that inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed. We
shall further assume that limit ask orders are uniformly placed in
the price classes from pbz1 to pbzn, where pb is the class of the
current best bids. Conversely, limit bid orders are uniformly
placed in the price classes from pa{n to pa{1, where pa is the
class of the current best asks. As mentioned above, the accessible
system states are limited by the condition pbvpa. When pa is
between 1 and n (pb between N{nz1 and N ), the bid
(respectively, ask) interval is restricted correspondingly. For
instance, if pa~1, no bids are possible. Finally, if no orders are
present in the book, the next bid, b, will be uniformly chosen in
p{nƒbƒp and the next ask, a in pƒaƒpzn, where p is the
price of the last trade. The specification of an initial price (which
can be interpreted as the opening auction price) is then sufficient
to start the auction. Figure 1 shows a state of this system and
illustrates the meaning of the various descriptions. Note that the
model outlined above is essentially the same as in [5] and [6]. In
terms of agent-based models, it is a zero intelligence agent-based model
[7]. However, our version does not suffer from using odd
mathematical objects such as uniform distributions over semi-
infinite intervals as in [5] and we do not assume that limit orders
arrive only at the best bid/ask prices as in [6]. Actually, in our case
limit orders arrive at prices that are different from the best bid/
ask. A preliminary discussion of our model was presented in [8].
The trade price process P(t) is a continuous-time random walk
that we wish to characterize as Cont and de Larrard did in
Sections 3 and 4 of [9]. However, they considered fixed bid-ask
spread equal to one tick, whereas in our case the bid-ask spread is
a random variable. Let Ti denote the epoch of the i-th trade; in
particular, we are interested in the behaviour of the following
random variable
Ri~log(P(Tiz1)=P(Ti)), ð1Þ
called the tick-by-tick logarithmic return, where log stands for the
natural logarithm. This is the usual variable used in statistical
finance and financial econometrics for the analysis of tick-by-tick
data [10]. It turns out that the behaviour of Ri crucially depends
on the presence or absence of statistical equilibrium in the supply
mechanism.
Main Results
Indeed, there are two main regimes in this model and they are
triggered by an ergodic transition. Let us denote by A(t) the total
number of limit ask orders and by B(t) the total number of limit
bid orders present in the book. By definition, these two random
processes are independent and they are M=M=1 queues with rates
la and mb and lb and ma, respectively [11]. M=M=1 queues are
the continuous-time equivalent of birth and death Markov chains.
The conditions for the existence of statistical equilibrium
(ergodicity) are given by the following inequalities
lavmb, ð2Þ
Figure 1. A state of the system. Limit bid orders are depicted by
circles whereas squares represent limit ask. Each order can be described
by a label. An individual description is a list showing, for each limit
order, whether it is a bid or an ask and to which category (price) it
b e l o n g s . H e r e , i t i s x1~(8,a), x2~(9,a), x3~(5,b), x4~(8,a),
x5~(4,b), x6~(5,b), x7~(5,b), x8~(3,b), x9~(7,a). A statistical de-
scription is a list that gives us the number of limit orders either of
bid or of ask type contained in each category. In this case it is
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10~0 for bid orders. Final-
ly, a partition description is the number of categories (prices) with zero
















Figure 2. Time series of prices and log-returns. Time series of prices and log-returns in a system of N~500 prices, length of interval for placing
orders n~5, with initial price p0~250 and number of simulated events t~10
5 . (a) ergodic case (r~0:8); (b) non-ergodic case for 1ƒrvn (r~1:2)
and (c) non-ergodic case for r§n (r~6).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088095.g002
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and
lbvma: ð3Þ
The intuitive meaning of these conditions is as follows. If the rate
of arrival for limit orders is larger than the rate of market orders,
then the number of orders in the book eventually explodes.
However, in this case, prices will be able to fluctuate only among a
few values. When the rate of market orders is larger than the rate
of limit orders, the number of orders in the book remains finite and
prices are free to fluctuate over the whole available range. In the
ergodic regime, the invariant (and equilibrium) distributions of
















































For our further analysis, we shall focus on the case of a
symmetric auction, assuming la~lb~l and ma~mb~m and we
shall consider the ratio r~l=m as the basic order parameter of the
model. In fact, there is no reason for a random auction to be
unbalanced towards selling or buying. As discussed above, if rv1,
we are in the ergodic regime, whereas for r§1, we are in a regime
where the orders accumulate and A(t),B(t)??, for t??. The
two regimes give rise to two radically different behaviours for the
tick-by-tick log-returns (1). This is qualitatively shown in Fig. 2,
where we report the behavior of prices and log-returns in a Monte
Carlo simulation for r~0:8 (Fig. 2 (a)), r~1:2 (Fig. 2 (b)) and for
r~6 (Fig. 2 (c)). One can see by eye that, in the ergodic regime,
high and low log-returns are clustered, whereas, in the non-ergodic
one, such a volatility clustering does not occur. Fig. 2 (a) clarifies
the origin of clustering. When the price is lower, log-returns are
higher and the price process has the persistence behavior typical of
random walks which immediately leads to clusters of low and high
volatility as the price slowly moves up and down, respectively. The
comparison between Fig. 2 (b) and Fig. 2 (c) shows that there are
two sub-regimes in the non-ergodic case. If 1ƒrvn, even if A(t)
and B(t) diverge, the limit orders belonging to the best bid and the
best ask can be removed by market orders and prices can fluctuate
among a set, whereas if r§n, then after a transient, the number of
limit orders belonging to the best bid and the best ask diverges and
prices can only fluctuate between two values. In this condition, the
price process becomes a random telegraph process. This behavior
is justified by the fact that the process of the number of orders at
the best bid price (respectively, best ask) can be coupled with the
state of an M=M=1 queue with arrival rate lb=n (la=n) and service
rate ma (mb); this is so because limit orders, upon arrival, distribute
uniformly over the n best prices. If lb=(man)~r=n§1, then the
number of orders at the best bid price converges to infinity, as
t??, meaning that all trades will occur at the price where the
bids accumulate. If lb=(man)~r=nv1, then the queue of the best
bids eventually empties with probability one, meaning that there is
a positive probability that the trading price changes. However, if









v1, then we know that
A(t),B(t)??, as t??. This means that the queue of the bids
at some price will eventually never empty, which means that trades
at lower prices will never occur. By symmetry, the same argument
holds for asks.
Figure 3. Mean values and error bars. Mean values and error bars of the standard deviation (a), kurtosis (b) of log-returns and the first-lag
autocorrelation of absolute log-returns (c) as functions of the parameter r, estimated from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088095.g003
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of log-returns.
r~0:1 r~0:8 r~1 r~1:2 r~6
mean {3:30:10{6 {7:47:10{7 {2:07:10{7 {1:92:10{9 {3:29:10{9
st. dev. 0.092 0.078 0.018 0.008 0.003
skewness 0.896 0.287 20.034 3:44:10{4 {3:80:10{7
kurtosis 227.089 277.33 116.679 3.373 2.004
c1 0.515 0.538 0.304 0.164 1:06:10{5
Descriptive statistics of log-returns and the autocorrelation coefficient at the
first lag of absolute log-returns (c1) for different r, made on 1000 runs of
simulation of 106 events.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088095.t001
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The transition between regimes can be detected studying the
moments of log-returns. In Table 1, we give the descriptive
statistics for log-returns, including mean, standard deviation,
skewness and kurtosis as well as the autocorrelation coefficient at
the first lag of absolute log-returns, c1, for different values of the
parameter r. These statistics are computed on 1000 simulation
runs with 106 events.
Figure 3 shows standard deviation, kurtosis and c1 in more
detail, namely mean values and error bars are given for these three
quantities estimated from 1000 runs. One can see that these
quantities increase in the non-ergodic case.
Our findings can be compared with those presented in a recent
study of financial stylized facts [12], where authors find that higher
rate of limit orders stabilizes the market by decreasing the standard
deviation of returns. In Fig. 4, we plot the sample autocorrelation
for the tick-by-tick absolute log-return series for r~0:8, r~1:2
and for r~6. A slow decay of the ACF in ergodic case, showing
long range-memory as well as heteroskedasticity, reminds the
stylized facts found in financial data. One can see that this decay is
much faster if r increases.
In Fig. 5, we plot the complementary cumulative distribution of
kurtosis values (Fig. 5 (a)) and of c1 (Fig. 5 (b)) for 1000 simulations
and for different values of r in order to corroborate the
observation made above: there is a jump in the kurtosis of
logarithmic returns as well as a jump in the first-lag autocorre-
lation of absolute log-returns as r moves from values larger than 1
to values smaller than 1.
Conclusions
In summary, in this paper we have shown that a symmetric
continuous double auction model has three regimes depending on
the value of the parameter r. If 0vrv1, we are in the ergodic
regime and prices are free to fluctuate over the full available price
range. In this regime, some of the so-called stylised facts of finance
appear, such as the heteroskedasticity of log-returns as shown in
Fig. 4 (a). However, this particular behaviour is simply due to the
persistence of the price process which is stronger when the
parameter n is smaller. An eye inspection of Fig. 2 (a) shows that
volatility clustering is caused by the fact that when the price is
small (close to zero), returns are larger than when the price is large
(close to N ). If n is small, the probability of large price jumps is
zero and the trade price remains close to its current value for some
time. For r§1, we have the transition to a non-ergodic regime
which stabilizes prices; they are no longer allowed to freely
fluctuate over all the available price range. However, there is a
further transition. If 1ƒrvn, where n is the size of the allowed
range for limit orders, prices can still fluctuate within a limited
range. If r§n, then prices will eventually fluctuate between two
values. If one sets n~1, this transition disappears. In fact, if n~1,
in the non-ergodic regime, limit orders accumulate only at the best
Figure 5. Empirical complementary cumulative distribution functions. Empirical complementary cumulative distribution functions of the
kurtosis of logarithmic returns (a) and the autocorrelation at the first-lag of absolute log-returns (b) for different values of r.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088095.g005
Figure 4. Sample autocorrelation functions for the absolute log-returns. (a) ergodic case (r~0:8); (b) non-ergodic case for 1ƒrvn (r~1:2)
and (c) non-ergodic case for r§n (r~6).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088095.g004
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bid and best ask value. Even if this further transition is a feature
of our simplified model, the distinction between the ergodic and
non-ergodic regimes is relevant for real equity markets. A
consequence of these results is that too frequent order removals
may lead to price instability. Our educated guess, which will be the
subject of further research, is that real markets live in the non-
ergodic regime, but not too far from the threshold.
Methods
Monte Carlo simulations
Monte Carlo simulations of the auction model were performed
with a MATLABHcode that is included in File S1. There are two
functions: cda.m and order.m. cda.m is a plain simulation of the
auction following the description in section Model. It calls the
function order.m that generates the flow of orders according to the
described distributions.
Theory
All the theoretical results presented here are corollaries of
theorems on M=M=1 queues from queueing theory [11]. The
notation M=M=1 means Markovian arrival process, Markovian
server process and 1 server and it is due to Kendall [13].
Supporting Information
File S1 Supporting information.
(PDF)
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